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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES
Monu Bedi*
INTRODUCTION
The third party and public disclosure doctrines (together the “disclosure doctrines”)
are long-standing hurdles to Fourth Amendment protection.1 These doctrines have
become increasingly relevant to assessing the government’s use of recent technologies
such as data mining, drone surveillance, and cell site location data.2 It is surprising then
that both the Supreme Court and scholars, at times, have associated them together as
expressing one principle.3 It turns out that each relies on unique foundational triggers
and does not stand or fall with the other. This Article tackles this issue and provides a
comprehensive topology for analyzing the respective contours of each doctrine.4
The third party doctrine involves an individual voluntarily disclosing information
to a third party and the government thereafter acquiring it from the third party.5 The na-
ture of the information—whether it is public or private—is not relevant.6 The individual
loses all Fourth Amendment protection to this information because she assumes the
risk the third party will hand it over to the government.7 The Supreme Court has
applied this doctrine to discrete conversations revealed to informants,8 bank records
relayed to bank employees,9 and phone numbers disclosed to phone companies.10
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. AB Dartmouth College,
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1 See discussion infra Sections I.A–B.
2 See, e.g., DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017)
[hereinafter GRAY, AGE OF SURVEILLANCE] (discussing Fourth Amendment protection and
the disclosure doctrines in light of recent technologies and big data collection). The focus
here is on the constitutionality of these practices, not any applicable statutory regulations or
laws. See infra Section II.B, Part III.
3 See discussion infra Section I.C.
4 I build on a prior essay on this topic. See generally Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of
Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 507
(2016) [hereinafter Bedi, Cell Phone Location Data].
5 See Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) [hereinafter Bedi, Facebook].
6 See id. at 12.
7 See id. at 2.
8 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that communications to an
informer were not privileged).
9 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that there is no Fourth
Amendment interest in bank communications).
10 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that phone numbers dialed are
not protected); see also discussion infra Section I.A.
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The public disclosure doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on an individual dis-
closing movements or items that are susceptible to visual observation.11 There is no
third party involved nor is one necessary for an application of the doctrine.12 The key
to vitiating Fourth Amendment protection is simply that the government is surveilling
these movements or observing these items while they are public. The Supreme Court
has applied this doctrine to government use of beeper tracking,13 GPS surveillance,14
and aerial reconnaissance.15
The Court as well as scholars have been guilty of grouping together these two
doctrines when assessing Fourth Amendment protection, particularly as it relates to new
technologies. For instance, in United States v. Jones16—the most recent Supreme
Court case on surveillance and technology—Justice Sotomayor in her now famous
concurrence argues that the third party doctrine may not be viable in today’s
technology-dominated world.17 This interesting non sequitur is puzzling as the case
only dealt with visual surveillance and the public disclosure doctrine.18 Scholars too—in
their assessment of mass surveillance and data collection—have lumped the two
doctrines together, suggesting they stand or fall as one.19 On one level, this association
is understandable as both doctrines involve waiving Fourth Amendment protection
to certain actions and assuming the risk the government will acquire the information.
But a more precise understanding of the respective elements of the doctrines is
imperative if scholars and courts are to properly assess Fourth Amendment protec-
tion when it comes to new methods of government surveillance and data collection.
For example, there may be instances where the third party doctrine applies—
such as mass collection of phone numbers or other private data—but there is no
potential application of the public disclosure doctrine because the information is not
public. Similarly, there may be instances where the public disclosure doctrine
applies—such as surreptitious government long-term monitoring using GPS or
drones—but there would be no application of the third party doctrine because there
is no knowing disclosure to a third party.
There also may be situations where both doctrines could potentially apply. I use
cell phone site location data as a case study.20 Courts seem to pick and choose a
11 Bedi, Cell Phone Location Data, supra note 4, at 513.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments from one place to another.”); see also discussion infra Section II.B.
13 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (applying the doctrine to beepers).
14 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (applying the doctrine to GPS).
15 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (applying the doctrine to aerial sur-
veillance); see also discussion infra Section I.B.
16 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
17 Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 412–13 (majority opinion).
19 See discussion infra Section I.C.
20 See discussion infra Section III.B.
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doctrine without a complete understanding of why one or the other applies (or does
not apply).21 These inconsistent results are primarily due to the unique nature of this
technology and the different ways one can conceptualize how the government collects
it. The data can be viewed as non-public information disclosed to a cell phone pro-
vider (suggesting a potential application of the third party doctrine) or seen as public
movements susceptible to visual surveillance (suggesting a potential application of
the public disclosure doctrine).22 The key to applying the right doctrine is recogniz-
ing in which of these two contexts the government activity is taking place.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an historical development of
each disclosure doctrine and how new technologies have impacted their respective
application. It also highlights how the Court and scholars have grouped together the
doctrines in assessing Fourth Amendment protection. Part II works with the Court’s
jurisprudence to tease out the respective elements of each doctrine. Part III explores
how these doctrines—with an understanding of their unique requirements—can
potentially apply to current issues of big data and new technologies, with a focus on
cell site location data. Working with a better understanding of the reach of each
disclosure doctrine, I provide a clearer picture of the relevant privacy considerations
in this unique context.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLATION OF THE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES
A. History of the Third Party Doctrine
1. Katz and Human Interaction
The early cases applying the third party doctrine centered on face-to-face con-
versations with government informants.23 Under these decisions, as long as agents
did not trespass on a person’s property, individuals did not have Fourth Amendment
protection in what they disclosed to an undercover informant, irrespective of the
individual’s belief that the informant would not disclose the information to the
government.24 Any such information can be gathered without a warrant or probable
cause and subsequently used against the person at trial.25 As the Court articulated,
“a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntary confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it” receives no protection under the Fourth Amendment.26
21 See discussion infra Section III.B.3.
22 See discussion infra Section III.B.3.
23 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952).
24 See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302–03; Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210–11.
25 See, e.g., Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438–40.
26 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
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This has become known as the “third party doctrine,” which states that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information a person voluntarily discloses to a third
party and thereafter acquired by the government.27
Katz v. United States28 dramatically reconceptualized Fourth Amendment analy-
sis but left unchanged the application of the third party doctrine.29 The Court no
longer restricted Fourth Amendment protection to a person’s property or physical
space; rather, the Court applied Fourth Amendment protection more broadly to any
situation in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.30 In holding
that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth,
Justice Harlan in his famous concurrence articulated the now well-known two-part
test for when Fourth Amendment protection applies: a person must have a subjective
expectation of privacy and the expectation must be objectively reasonable.31
Shortly after Katz, in 1971, in United States v. White,32 the Supreme Court explic-
itly made clear that the third party doctrine survived the new expectation of privacy
test.33 In White, a government informant, without first seeking a warrant, used a radio
transmitter to surreptitiously transmit conversations with the defendant at various
locations, including the defendant’s home.34 The Court found no Fourth Amendment
violation in using these transmitted conversations at trial because the defendant
voluntarily disclosed the information to a third party, which vitiated any reasonable
expectation of privacy.35 It did not matter that the defendant may have subjectively
believed the conversation was being kept secret or the informant was not working
with police to record the information.36 This actual expectation was not constitution-
ally justified because “the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is or becomes a police agent.”37
United States v. Miller38 extended the third party doctrine beyond conversations
to include personal documents and records conveyed to third parties.39 In Miller, by
voluntarily disclosing records to a bank and its employees, the defendant lost any
claim of Fourth Amendment protection to those documents.40 Citing Katz, the Court
27 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); see also Bedi, Facebook, supra
note 5, at 8 (discussing history and development of the third party doctrine and how it vitiates
Fourth Amendment privacy protection).
28 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 350–53.
31 Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
33 See id.
34 Id. at 746–47.
35 Id. at 751–52.
36 Id. at 752.
37 Id.
38 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
39 Id. at 445.
40 Id. at 442–43.
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explained that the defendant’s misplaced subjective belief or trust that these records
would only be used for a limited financial purpose did not change the fact that once
he conveyed the information to the bank employees he took the risk that the govern-
ment may obtain this information from them.41 Thus, the Court held that the defen-
dant could not object to the government acquiring the documents from the bank
without a warrant as he possessed no Fourth Amendment interest in the items.42
2. Disclosures to Machines and Companies
In Smith v. Maryland,43 the Court took the third party doctrine one step further
and applied it to information disclosed to a telephone company’s automated switch-
ing equipment.44 In Smith, the government requested that the phone company set up
a “pen register,” a device intended to record all outgoing phone numbers dialed by
the defendant from his home.45 The device was installed at the phone company’s
offices; at no point did the government enter the defendant’s property.46 The Court
upheld the warrantless use of the pen register, stating that the Fourth Amendment
did not protect the numbers dialed by the telephone user.47 Applying the two-part
Katz test, the Court held that the defendant did not have a subjective expectation of
privacy in the dialed numbers, nor would any such expectation be reasonable.48
Telephone users realize that they must convey the number to the telephone company
in order to make a call and that the company has facilities for making permanent
records of the numbers dialed.49
Further, and more importantly, the Court held that any subjective expectation
of privacy (assuming one existed) was not something society would find reason-
able.50 Citing Miller, the Court concluded that the defendant did not satisfy the
second element of the Katz test because he did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the dialed numbers.51 The Court explained that “[w]hen he used his phone,
41 See id.
42 Id. at 440–46.
43 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 737. This device “records the numbers dialed . . . by monitoring the electrical
impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released.” Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)). The device does not record the
conversations that take place after a call has been made. Id. (citing New York Tel. Co., 434
U.S. at 161 n.1).
46 Id. at 741.
47 Id. at 745–46.
48 See id.
49 Id. at 742.
50 Id. at 743.
51 Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976)).
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[the defendant] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company
and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”52
The fact that the number was disclosed to an automated machine instead of a
human being was of no consequence.53 The Court explained:
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely
the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day,
personally completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes
that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim
no legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold
that a different constitutional result is required because the tele-
phone company has decided to automate.54
This point is critical to the holding in Smith. The Court did not address whether a
human being actually observed the number being dialed.55 This apparently was not rele-
vant.56 All that mattered was that the defendant voluntarily exposed the number to a
third party’s machine—in this case, the telephone company’s switching equipment.57
The implication here is that an individual will likely lose Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to any information she exposes to a third party’s machine in the normal course
of business, regardless of whether a human actually observes the information.58
The holding in Smith v. Maryland—while seemingly an uncontroversial applica-
tion of the third party doctrine—has led to difficult questions regarding disclosure to
companies in today’s technology-dominated world.59 Take the fact that nearly all data,
including emails, are stored with third party servers or Internet service providers.60
Internet service providers (ISPs) like Gmail, Facebook and other companies—not
unlike phone companies using phone numbers to contact individuals—store these
52 Id. at 744.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 744–45 (internal citation omitted).
55 See id.
56 See id.; see also Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581, 600 (2011) (“[T]here is no legally relevant difference between disclosure of one’s
personal information to a third party’s automated systems and disclosure to a human being.”).
57 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45; Tokson, supra note 56, at 600.
58 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45; Tokson, supra note 56, at 600.
59 See Bedi, Facebook, supra note 5, at 15–32 (discussing the role of third party servers in
transmission of communications over the Internet and the potential implication of the third party
doctrine); Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment
Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1809 (2014) [hereinafter Bedi, Mosaic Theory] (discussing
how the mosaic theory may protect internet communications from the third party doctrine).
60 Tokson, supra note 56, at 585; see PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS
88–99 (8th ed. 2007) (describing how emails are transmitted and stored).
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communications for brief periods in order to deliver them to their recipient.61 The
third party doctrine would suggest that the government can acquire this information
from the ISP without first seeking a warrant.62 The Court has to yet decide whether
the third party doctrine vitiates Fourth Amendment privacy in this context.63 Some
appellate courts have found that these communications are potentially subject to the
third party doctrine whereas others attempt to distinguish the type of information
contained in the communication to support privacy protection.64 Scholars too dis-
agree on how the Fourth Amendment should apply to these disclosures.65
61 See GRALLA, supra note 60, at 89 (“The [Transmission Control] protocol breaks your
messages into packets, the IP protocol delivers the packets to the proper location, and then
the TCP reassembles the message on the receiving mail server so it can be read.”); Orin S.
Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change
Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 813–14 (2003) (describing how emails are routed
by equipment owned by the ISP that processes their data); Tokson, supra note 56, at 602–03
(describing how email service providers, such as Gmail and Hotmail, store email data). Even
deleted emails are at least temporarily stored on third party systems. See, e.g., James X.
Dempsey, Digital Search and Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to Keep Pace with
Technology, in 1 SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND
PRACTICES IN A SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD 505, 523 (2006) (“[S]ince ISPs [such as Gmail
and Yahoo] retain data for varying lengths of time, and do not always delete email imme-
diately upon request, customers may not be aware of whether their email is still stored and
thus susceptible to disclosure.”).
62 See Bedi, Facebook, supra note 5, at 15–18 (discussing application of third party
doctrine to internet communications). It is important to note that even if the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply, separate statutory restrictions are in place before the government can
obtain these communications. Id. at 31–36 (discussing congressional legislation and specifically
Electronic Communications Privacy Act as means to protect internet communications); see
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3117, 3121–3127 (2012)).
63 See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 844 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court
has not yet addressed the question of privacy rights in email material.”).
64 See id. at 846 (“Given the lack of precedent, we now question whether it would be
prudent in this case and on this limited factual record to establish broad precedent as to the
reasonable privacy expectation in email content.”); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
285–87 (6th Cir. 2010) (analogizing emails to letters and finding that content of emails but
not the subject/to lines garner Fourth Amendment protection even though voluntarily
transmitted to ISP); In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009) (noting
that email users “voluntarily conveyed to the ISPs and exposed to the ISP’s employees in the
ordinary course of business the contents of their e-mails”); see also Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that users have an expectation
of privacy in the contents of their text messages), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon,
560 U.S. 746 (2010) (holding that the search, even if it did implicate the Fourth Amendment,
was in any case reasonable).
65 See, e.g., Bedi, Facebook, supra note 5, at 18–28 (discussing theories by Professors
Matthew Tokson (automation rationale), Orin Kerr (content vs. non-content), and Katherine
Strandburg (technosocial theory) on ways to protect internet communications despite third
party doctrine).
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The ability of the government to collect massive amounts of data further com-
plicates a straightforward third party doctrine calculus. Smith v. Maryland only dealt
with one phone number over a short period of time.66 Does the analysis change if we
are dealing with significant amounts of data mining over longer periods of time? In
2013, it came to light that the National Security Agency was working with Verizon
to collect massive amounts of phone numbers of thousands of subscribers over a
number of years.67 While the government did seek statutory approval prior to this
collection, the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit on behalf of the sub-
scribers alleging that this activity fell under the Fourth Amendment and thus the
government was required to first obtain a warrant supported by probable cause.68
After two years of debate, Congress changed the relevant law surrounding this type
of collection.69 Meanwhile, the cases made their way through the Second and D.C.
Circuits where both appellate courts ultimately punted on the relevant Fourth Amend-
ment question, resting their findings on other grounds.70 Scholars have tackled the
constitutionality of this practice and debated how (if at all) bulk collection of private
data more generally can garner Fourth Amendment protection in light of the third
party doctrine.71
66 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); supra notes 43–58 and ac-
companying text.
67 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun
/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/3C2B-YDEF] (describing the
extent of government collection of the phone records of U.S. citizens). There was no evi-
dence that the government was otherwise monitoring the content of the calls. See generally id.
68 Ellen Nakashima & Scott Wilson, ACLU Sues over NSA Surveillance Program, WASH.
POST (June 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/aclu-sues-over-nsa-surveil
lance-program/2013/06/11/fef71e2e-d2ab-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html [https://perma
.cc/H56L-NYBD].
69 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdrop-
ping, Dragnet-Collection, and Online Monitoring Act of 2015 (USA FREEDOM Act), Pub.
L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2015)); see also Nicole B. Cásarez,
The Synergy of Privacy and Speech, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 813, 823–36 (2016) (discussing
the history of the new law and arguing that, while it did limit the government’s ability to
obtain this kind of bulk information, the new legislation does not terminate the program).
70 See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 824 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Because we conclude that
the challenged program was not authorized by the statute on which the government bases its
claim of legal authority, we need not and do not reach these weighty constitutional issues.”);
Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Having barely fulfilled the
requirements for standing at this threshold stage, Plaintiffs fall short of meeting the higher
burden of proof required for a preliminary injunction.”).
71 See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Why the NSA Data Seizures Are Unconstitutional, 38 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 8–9 (2015) (distinguishing Smith v. Maryland and mass collection on
particularity grounds); Bedi, Facebook, supra note 5 (using interpersonal privacy rights to
protect social networking communications); Cásarez, supra note 69, at 850–53 (applying
First Amendment to protect bulk collection of domestic communications metadata); David
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More recently, courts and scholars have struggled with how the third party doc-
trine should apply in the context of the government acquiring historical cell site
location data.72 I will address this unique situation in greater detail below.73 The pur-
pose of this Article, however, in the end is not to fully debate and resolve the merits
of Fourth Amendment protection in these various technology-based contexts. Rather,
the key takeaway is to recognize that the third party doctrine conceptually is not
limited by the nature of the disclosure (it can potentially apply to voice conversa-
tions, physical information, electronic data, etc.) nor to whom it is disclosed (it can
potentially apply to individuals, companies, ISPs, etc.).74
B. History of Public Disclosure Doctrine
1. Visual Observation of Public Information
The first cases of the public disclosure doctrine centered on visual observation
by police in public. In Hester v. United States,75 the Court found no issue with police
observing the movements of the defendant or the items carried by him outside his
home from a distance away.76 Because the defendant’s actions were out in the open
for all to see, these movements garnered no Fourth Amendment protection.77 This
Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) (using
a technology-centered approach to quantitative privacy to protect against government col-
lection of mass data).
72 See discussion infra Section III.B.
73 See discussion infra Section III.B.
74 The Court seems to have carved out an exception to the third party doctrine for certain
disclosures conveying content as opposed to non-content information. Compare Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (holding that letters and sealed packages cannot be opened
unless the government obtains a warrant), with United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249,
251–52 (1970) (finding that a 29-hour holding of suspicious First-Class packages was not un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). See also Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Enve-
lope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2162–63 (2009) (arguing that
courts could limit the third party doctrine reasoning in Smith by applying it only to non-content
information over the Internet); Bedi, Facebook, supra note 5. Lower courts have gone further
to carve out exceptions for disclosures made to lawyers or medical providers. See, e.g., Doe
v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450–52 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that detective’s examination of
a patient file held by a methadone clinic was a search and, without probable cause, violated
the patient’s Fourth Amendment rights); DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that “an attorney’s clients have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their
client files”).
75 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
76 Id. at 58–59.
77 Id. at 59 (“[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people
in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.” (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
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became known as the public disclosure doctrine, which says that there is no privacy
protection for a person’s movements in public.78
The Katz reconceptualization and the introduction of Harlan’s two-part test for
reasonable expectation of privacy did not change the operation of this doctrine.79 In
that case, the government installed, without a warrant and unbeknownst to the de-
fendant, a listening device in a phone booth that was used by the defendant to make
illegal gambling calls.80 The Court found that this recording violated the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment right to privacy and satisfied the now famous two-part test.81
The defendant purposefully entered the telephone booth, shut the door behind him,
and paid the toll that permits him to place a call.82 The Court found that, collectively,
these actions exhibited an expectation of privacy and that this belief was reasonable.83
Thus, the government was required to obtain a warrant before intercepting the call.84
However, the Court also explained that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”85 In the instant case, the booth was partly constructed out of glass such
that the defendant was visible in the same way before or after he closed the door and
made the call.86 The Court went on to say that the defendant sought to exclude the
“uninvited ear,” not the “intruding eye.”87 The implication here is that the police were
free to observe the defendant through the glass without first seeking a warrant because
that information (unlike the defendant’s voice) was open for all the public to see.88
The Court has applied the public disclosure doctrine beyond what a police of-
ficer can see from the ground to include visual surveillance from above. In California
v. Ciraolo,89 the police secured a private plane and flew over the defendant’s home
at an altitude of 1,000 feet and visually identified marijuana growing in the yard.90
78 See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (“The exterior of a car, of course,
is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’”); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that “objects, ac-
tivities, or statements that [a person] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders” do not receive
Fourth Amendment protection).
79 389 U.S. at 359.
80 Id. at 348.
81 Id. at 359.
82 Id. at 352 (“One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that per-
mits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world.”).
83 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. at 352 (majority opinion).
84 Id. at 357–58 (majority opinion).
85 Id. at 351.
86 Id. at 352.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
90 Id. at 209.
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The Court found that no warrant was required for this kind of surveillance.91 Using
the Katz two-part test, the Court first conceded that the defendant likely had a sub-
jective intent of privacy because he erected a ten-foot fence to conceal the marijuana
crop from street-level views.92 However, the Court found this expectation unreason-
able because the defendant voluntarily exposed his backyard to visual observation
from publicly navigable airspace.93
The public disclosure doctrine also explains the Court’s ruling on garbage
placed outside an individual’s residence. In California v. Greenwood,94 the defendant
placed his garbage in plastic bags and left them on the curb in front of the house.95 The
police searched the bags and found items indicative of narcotics.96 Citing Katz, the
Court found that even if the defendant subjectively thought that “there was little
likelihood that [the bags] would be inspected by anyone,” there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the bag because defendant voluntarily “exposed the[ ] gar-
bage to the public sufficiently to defeat [a] claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”97
The Court noted that the bags were left on the public street and were readily accessi-
ble to anyone including children, scavengers, and animals.98
While the holding relied on the public disclosure alone, it is interesting that the
Court also seemed to reference an application of the third party doctrine.99 The police
officer in this case actually received the bags from the trash collector after asking
him to collect the garbage and turn it over to the authorities.100 The Court noted that
the defendant “placed the[ ] refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying
it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through [defen-
dant’s] trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.”101 This is another way
of saying that the defendant voluntarily disclosed the garbage to a third party—in
this case the trash collector—and thus lost all Fourth Amendment protection to it.
I will address situations where both doctrines can apply in greater detail below.102
For now, it is enough to say that a proper application of either doctrine is sufficient
to vitiate privacy protection.
91 Id. at 215.
92 Id. at 211.
93 Id. at 213; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (hold-
ing that use of an aerial mapping camera to photograph an industrial complex does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment because the property was susceptible to visual surveillance
from above).
94 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
95 Id. at 37.
96 Id. at 37–38.
97 Id. at 39–40.
98 Id. at 40.
99 See id.
100 Id. at 37–38.
101 Id. at 40.
102 See discussion infra Section III.A.
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2. GPS and Beyond
Technological advancements and the rise of big data—much like in the third
party doctrine context—have complicated the application of the public disclosure
doctrine. The first Supreme Court case to tackle enhanced surveillance technology
beyond visual observation seems uncontroversial.
In United States v. Knotts,103 the police lawfully placed a beeper inside a con-
tainer of chemicals purchased by the defendant.104 The beeper emitted a signal, which
allowed the authorities to track the package for an entire afternoon.105 Without first
seeking a warrant, the police tracked the container as it was transported in two sep-
arate vehicles until it reached its destination, the defendant’s cabin.106 In applying
the public disclosure doctrine and finding no Fourth Amendment protection here,
the Court reasoned:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another. When [the defendant] traveled over the public
streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look
the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular
direction . . . .107
It did not matter that, without the beeper system, the police would not have been
able to maintain visual observation of the defendant to his ultimate destination.108
The Court noted that this technological advancement simply augmented traditional
visual surveillance by providing a more efficient means to monitor a defendant’s
movements through public streets.109 The Court, however, specifically left open the
possibility of a different constitutional conclusion if the surveillance had lasted for
a full day or longer.110
103 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
104 Id. at 278.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 281–82.
108 Id. at 282 (“The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance,
but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the defendant’s] automobile to the
police receiver, does not alter the situation.”).
109 Id. (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sen-
sory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology
afforded them in this case.”).
110 Id. at 283–84 (“[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent en-
visions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable.” (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
566 (1978)).
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The issue of long-term surveillance using a technological device finally reached
the Court in its most recent decision on the public disclosure doctrine and new tech-
nology. In United States v. Jones,111 the government—without the consent or knowl-
edge of the defendant or under the terms of a warrant—installed a Global Positioning
System (GPS) device under his car and tracked his public movements with the de-
vice for nearly thirty days.112 The Court (both the majority and concurrences) wrestled
with how this government activity could fall under the scrutiny of the Fourth Amend-
ment when the public disclosure doctrine mandated that none of this surveillance
would garner constitutional protection.113
The majority focused on the initial act of placing the GPS device under the car
as constituting an unlawful physical trespass without reaching the issue of the
surveillance itself.114 Though it bypassed a direct analysis of the potential applica-
tion of the public disclosure doctrine in this context, the majority did note that any
such discussion would lead to a host of “particularly vexing problems” on the nature
of visual observation versus technologically enhanced surveillance, and the problem
of drawing lines between what constitutes short-term from longer-term surveillance.115
However, the concurring opinions took this issue head on. Both Justices
Sotomayor and Alito found that a straightforward application of the public disclo-
sure doctrine was not appropriate given the length of surveillance and the technology
employed.116 “I would ask,” explained Justice Sotomayor, “whether people reasonably
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”117 She felt that the net result of this long-term GPS
monitoring may chill “associational and expressive freedoms” and fundamentally
111 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
112 Id. at 402–03 (the GPS ultimately “relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over the 4-
week period”).
113 Id. at 404–13; id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418–31 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
114 Id. at 404–05 (majority opinion) (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,
constitutes a ‘search.’”). The majority went on to say:
[E]ven assuming that the concurrence is correct to say that “[t]raditional
surveillance” of Jones for a 4-week period “would have required a
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,”
our cases suggest that such visual observation is constitutionally permis-
sible. It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means,
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.
Id. at 412 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
115 Id. at 411–12 (quoting id. at 426 (Alito, J., concurring)).
116 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 428–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
117 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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“alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.”118
Along the same lines, Justice Alito expressed concern over the government’s
unfettered ability to conduct long-term monitoring using GPS technology.119 He
explained that the facts here arose from the use of new surveillance technology and
that prior to the computer age, this type of extended police surveillance would not
have been possible.120 While he recognized reasonableness is a moving target shaped
by technological advancements, he concluded that, for now, “society’s expectation
has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main,
simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an in-
dividual’s car for a very long period.”121
These arguments by Justices Sotomayor and Alito more generally have come
to be known as the mosaic theory.122 The basic premise of the theory is that even
though the individual or discrete movements lose protection because of their ex-
posure to public view, the aggregation of these movements via enhanced technology
may constitute something worthy of Fourth Amendment protection.123
This type of dragnet surveillance is not limited to GPS technology. The rise of
comprehensive surveillance—through public cameras and unmanned drones—may
suggest other applications of the mosaic theory to combat the public disclosure
doctrine.124 Government cameras are already in public areas and have the ability to
capture a large amount of a person’s movements.125 Drone use—which continue to
grow in size—may pose even a greater threat to privacy.126 These devices have ad-
vanced capability to covertly and constantly capture all public movements with greater
precision and magnification.127 Scholars have debated if the mosaic theory or some
118 Id. (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum,
J., concurring)).
119 Id. at 428 (Alito, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 429.
121 Id. at 430.
122 See Bedi, Mosaic Theory, supra note 59, at 1810–11.
123 See, e.g., id. at 1810–11, 1834–48.
124 See, e.g., Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527 (2017).
125 See, e.g., id. at 539–42 (noting the dramatic advances in camera technology, including
facial recognition); Afsheen John Radsan, The Case for Stewart over Harlan on 24/7 Phys-
ical Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1475 (2010) (discussing potential of constant monitoring
by law enforcement using public cameras).
126 See, e.g., Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 354, 357 (2016) (“Some estimate that 30,000 drones will be flying in the
national airspace (‘NAS’) by the end of the decade, while others suggest that as many as one
million drones will be sold in 2015 alone.” (citations omitted)).
127 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance:
Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 31, 33 (2013);
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other limiting principle may provide Fourth Amendment protection for this kind of
law enforcement surveillance that seemingly falls outside of constitutional scru-
tiny.128 My purpose is not to fully assess the merits of the public disclosure doctrine
in these new contexts but simply recognize that emerging surveillance technology
and its ability to observe large amounts of information with advanced precision may
impact how we apply this doctrine.129
C. The Doctrines as a Single Principle
On a number of occasions, the Court has discussed the disclosure doctrines as
embodying a single or unified expression of privacy or lack thereof. United States
v. Knotts—a case dealing with surveillance of public movements—provides such
an example.130 Here, the Court discussed and cited to Smith v. Maryland—a case
involving the third party doctrine—in support of its finding that public movements
garner no Fourth Amendment protection.131 The Court detailed the circumstances
and findings in Smith v. Maryland as constituting the “factual counterpart” to the
public movements at issue in the Knotts case.132
Kyllo v. United States133 provides another illustration. The issue in that case
centered on the constitutionality of a thermal imaging device the police had set up
across from the defendant’s house to detect heat emanating from his home.134 The
Gray & Citron, supra note 71, at 105–06; Jake Laperruque, Preventing an Air Panopticon:
A Proposal for Reasonable Legal Restrictions on Aerial Surveillance, 51 U. RICH. L. REV.
705, 706–11 (2017); Levinson-Waldman, supra note 124, at 542–44.
128 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth
Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015) (using the Fourth Amendment to constitu-
tionally limit government use of drone surveillance); Gray & Citron, supra note 71, at 101–03
(using a technology-centered approach to limit the impact of public disclosure doctrine on
Fourth Amendment protection); Laperruque, supra note 127, at 722–26 (distinguishing
naked-eye observations from observations via technology to limit the impact of public dis-
closure doctrine); Levinson-Waldman, supra note 124, at 555–79 (incorporating mosaic
theory with multifactor approach to limiting public surveillance). Others focus on statutory
or legislative remedies to limit this kind of surveillance. McNeal, supra note 126, at 394–95.
129 This type of inquiry—the impact of technology on the application of the disclosure
doctrines—has historical roots in early Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 790 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment does, of
course, leave room for the employment of modern technology in criminal law enforcement,
but in the stream of current developments in Fourth Amendment law I think it must be held
that third-party electronic monitoring, subject only to the self-restraint of law enforcement
officials, has no place in our society.”).
130 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
131 Id. at 283 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979)).
132 Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45).
133 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
134 Id. at 29.
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Court ultimately found that this government activity did trigger Fourth Amendment
protection and that the public disclosure doctrine did not apply.135 Because there was
no evidence or contention that the defendant was aware of this device, there would
be no possible application of the third party doctrine.136 Nevertheless, as part of its
analysis, the Court listed Smith v. Maryland together with two aerial surveillance
cases as expressing the same reasonable expectation of privacy test.137 The dissent,
in finding that the heat was simply something that the defendant exposed to the public,
also cited to Smith v. Maryland in the same sentence as an aerial surveillance case
when discussing the inferences within a home.138
To the extent these exemplars seem indirect or somewhat exaggerated, United
States v. Jones stands as a more direct and explicit instance of the conflation of the
two doctrines. As explained above, this case only dealt with the public disclosure doc-
trine and the surveillance of an individual through public streets.139 Justice Sotomayor,
in her concurrence, discussed the problems with this kind of long-term monitoring.140
At the conclusion of her opinion, she added a puzzling a part about the third party
doctrine—a seeming non sequitur. She argued:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the prem-
ise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This ap-
proach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the
URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books,
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.141
It is not clear why she referenced Smith v. Maryland and these specific disclosures.
All of them—phone numbers, texts, emails, medications, books—squarely implicate
the third party doctrine but have nothing to do with observing public movements,
135 Id. at 31–34. The Court distinguished this case from the aerial surveillance cases on
the grounds that the thermal imaging device (which was not in general public use) went be-
yond naked-eye surveillance and revealed information within a person’s home that would
otherwise have required physical intrusion. Id. at 33–38.
136 See id. at 32–33 (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44).
137 Id. at 33.
138 Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 442 U.S. 735).
139 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
140 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 417 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976)).
2017] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES 477
which was the issue in the case.142 It is interesting that she introduces this argument
by the phrase “[m]ore fundamentally,” which seems to suggest that the third party
doctrine somehow underlies both disclosure doctrines.
Scholars too (admittedly, including me) have associated the doctrines as ex-
pressing one principle when assessing the merits of their application. Professor
Stephen Henderson, for example, makes a compelling case for establishing a multi-
factor test to limit the application of the third party doctrine.143 While the merits of
the argument are not relevant here, it is interesting that he classifies cases like
Knotts—which only involve visual surveillance—as falling under the third party
doctrine calculus.144 Professor Katherine Strandburg, in arguing for expanded Fourth
Amendment privacy protection for use of the internet from the home, devotes a
section on the pitfalls of the third party doctrine in which she includes cases dealing
with informants, garbage, aerial and GPS surveillance.145 Professor Matthew Tokson
provides a conceptual framework for assessing the knowledge or voluntary require-
ment in the disclosure doctrine contexts but, in doing so, associates the third party
and the public disclosure doctrines as representing a single principle of exposure and
loss of privacy protection.146 In crafting a constitutional theory using the mosaic
theory to protect social networking communications on the Internet, I similarly dis-
cuss the two doctrines as analogs of each other as part of my argument to assess the
merits of privacy protection in these situations.147
On one level this close association by the Court and scholars is understandable.
Both doctrines can be seen as waiver or consent principles. Under this interpretation,
an individual “consents or waives her right to Fourth Amendment protection by dis-
closing the information to another person or disclosing her movements to the public
at large.”148 And, “[i]t is not relevant that the individual makes this disclosure
thinking that the information or her movements will remain private.”149 While both
doctrines thus contemplate an assumption of risk by the individual, the specific risk
142 Compare discussion supra Section I.A, with Section I.B.
143 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011).
144 He also cites to United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–58 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the
D.C. Circuit opinion upon which United States v. Jones is based. See Henderson, supra note
143, at 43.
145 Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment
Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 633–36 (2011).
146 See Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
139 (2016) [hereinafter Tokson, Knowledge]; see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking out
of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C.
L. REV. 1, 37–42 (2012) (discussing implications of United States v. Jones by explicitly linking
Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller to the surveillance cases as foundational cases).
147 See Bedi, Mosaic Theory, supra note 59, at 1820–31, 1843–45.
148 See id. at 1826.
149 Id.
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involved is quite different. In the third party scenario, the individual assumes the
risk that the person to whom she discloses the information will reveal it to the gov-
ernment. In the public disclosure scenario, the individual assumes the risk that her
public movements are being contemporaneously surveilled by the government.150
Other scholars perhaps have done a better job of identifying these as two distinct
principles. Professor David Gray, in a recent book on police surveillance, devotes
a separate section to each of the disclosure doctrines and seems to recognize their
unique contours.151 What is missing from his work, however, is a doctrinal frame-
work for when these respective doctrines apply. This Article fills this important gap
by articulating the key elements that trigger the application of each doctrine.
II. THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES
A. Trigger for Third Party Doctrine
A proper application of the third party doctrine contemplates three things: (1)
there is a voluntary disclosure (2) of non-public information to a third party (3) from
which the government acquires the information.152 The first requirement is relatively
straightforward. In all the aforementioned third party cases—disclosing verbal con-
versations, phone numbers, financial records, etc.—the individual is voluntarily or
knowingly providing the information to the third party.153 These disclosures occur
in the normal course of the interaction or business transaction.154 In other words,
coercing an incriminating statement by putting a gun to a suspect’s head or other-
wise threatening a person to hand over the information would in all likelihood not
satisfy the voluntariness requirement.155
150 See Arcila, supra note 146, at 38 (“The assumption-of-risk doctrine is particularly preva-
lent in the context of informants and co-occupants. The third party and assumption-of-risk
doctrines played a central role in Jones because they led to the United States v. Knotts . . . .”
(citations omitted)); Strandburg, supra note 145, at 635 (“The first, ‘assumption of risk,’ step
of the third party doctrine argument is pervasive in Fourth Amendment law. It underlies cases
such as those involving searches of garbage left for pickup, undercover policing and use of
informants, and law enforcement ‘flyovers’ of residential areas.” (internal citations omitted)).
151 See GRAY, AGE OF SURVEILLANCE, supra note 2, at 78–89.
152 See Bedi, Mosaic Theory, supra note 59, at 1813–15.
153 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (disclosing phone number during
normal course of business); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (disclosing financial
records to bank); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (disclosing information during
personal conversations). I use the terms voluntarily and knowingly interchangeably. For a
more detailed discussion on the voluntary or knowing requirements in the Fourth Amend-
ment context, see generally Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 146.
154 See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38 (discussing business transaction); White, 401 U.S.
at 746–47 (discussing interactions).
155 See cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (reasoning that proper consent
to search requires voluntariness where defendant was not coerced by police).
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The second element focuses on the fact that the information disclosed will most
often be non-public. When it comes to incriminating statements, dialed phone num-
bers, and bank records, all of these items are private information that are not available
to the public at large.156 It is no accident that the Court talks about misplaced trust
and assuming the risk of the third party disclosing the information to the government
when discussing the effect of the doctrine.157 If the information were otherwise pub-
licly available, the individual generally would not be taking on any additional risk
by disclosing to a third party.
I qualify this analysis because there can be instances (albeit infrequent) where
public information—i.e., susceptible to visual surveillance—is disclosed to a third
party. I already talked about the circumstances under which disposing of garbage can
trigger the third party doctrine.158
A more recent example embodying new technology would be the use of Google
Street View. Started in 2007, this application allows users to obtain pictures of streets
and the exterior of residences.159 While it doesn’t allow for real-time observation,
it does permit users to observe past images as if they were positioned from the vantage
point of a pedestrian on-site.160 The images are readily available to anyone.161 It should
come as no surprise then that law enforcement have used these historical images to
investigate cases.162 No one would suggest the police need a warrant or probable
cause before making this inquiry.163 An individual does not seem to have any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy to these images.
The third party doctrine provides a doctrinal hook for why the government can
use this service without any Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Here, an individual volun-
tarily discloses her movements or other information to Google when she is outside.
156 See discussion supra Section I.A.
157 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966).
158 See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
159 See Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 331, 350 (2012) (discussing the history of Google Street View and its capabilities); see
also Street View, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/maps/views/streetview [https://perma.cc
/KD86-K2T8] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
160 See Blitz et al., supra note 128, at 75; Leary, supra note 159, at 345–51; Street View,
supra note 159.
161 See Blitz et al., supra note 128, at 75; Leary, supra note 159, at 345–46.
162 See Blitz et al., supra note 128, at 75 (citing instances where law enforcement used the
application); Benjamin Fearnow, Google Street View Images Catch Robbery Suspects in the
Act 3 Years Later, CBS HOUSTON (July 15, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://houston.cbslocal.com
/2014/07/15/google-street-view-images-catch-robbery-suspects-in-the-act-3-years-later/
[https://perma.cc/MJ7H-8DCP].
163 See Blitz et al., supra note 128, at 75–76. But see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY
AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 98–108
(2007) (arguing public camera surveillance should be limited based on First and Fourth Amend-
ment grounds).
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The government acquires the information no differently than telephone data or bank
records. Given the prevalence of this Google technology and how long it has been
in existence, an individual is on constructive notice that her public movement/activities
are being stored by the company, much like an individual is on notice that the phone
company will store the numbers one dials.164 An individual therefore assumes the
risk that the images may find themselves in the hands of the government.165
The third requirement—that the government acquires the information from the
third party—is critical to a proper application of the doctrine. This feature under-
scores the assumption of risk analysis discussed above.166 The point here is that the
third party (e.g., telephone provider, informant, Google) at the behest of the govern-
ment will hand over the information, not that the government will acquire the infor-
mation directly bypassing the third party altogether. Indeed, the Court’s most recent
case on technology and Fourth Amendment protection confirms this requirement.
In Riley v. California,167 the Court ruled that a police officer could not search phone
numbers on a cell phone as part of a search incident to the arrest of a recent car oc-
cupant.168 It specifically cited Smith v. Maryland as inapposite precedent to support
searching a cell phone in this instance.169 This is because the police officer would
be looking through the dialed numbers directly (thus, not satisfying element (3))
instead of obtaining the numbers from the cell phone provider.170
B. Trigger for Public Disclosure Doctrine
A proper application of the public disclosure doctrine requires three things:
(1) there is a voluntary disclosure (2) of movements/items that are susceptible to
164 See cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (finding defendant had no Fourth
Amendment protection—because of third party doctrine—to conversations simultaneously
transmitted to police agent even though defendant not aware of second agent). The third
party doctrine, a fortiori, provides a doctrinal justification for why a person loses all privacy
protection to a public item or movement photographed or otherwise witnessed by a neighbor
that the government thereafter requests to be introduced at trial. Individuals are on construc-
tive notice that their public actions may be observed/photographed by fellow citizens. The public
disclosure doctrine may possibly provide a separate basis for why this kind of public activity
does not garner privacy protection. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
165 Even if an individual subjectively believes that their public activities will not be cap-
tured by Google or be captured for a limited purpose not related to law enforcement, this
belief would not be reasonable. See supra notes 38–73 and accompanying text (discussing
the operative facts in Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller and unreasonableness
of any subjective expectation to privacy of information disclosed to third parties).
166 See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
167 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
168 Id. at 2485 (finding that the unique nature of electronic data on cell phones forecloses
the rationale for allowing search incident to arrest of phone numbers and other data without
a warrant).
169 Id. at 2492 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
170 See id. at 2492–93.
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public observation and (3) the government is contemporaneously monitoring the
movements/information.171 The first requirement tracks the first requirement of the
third party doctrine. An individual must voluntarily or freely make the disclosure.
However, unlike the third party doctrine, there is no requirement of a knowing dis-
closure to a third party.
The second requirement simply focuses on the public nature of the act. The indi-
vidual must make a certain movement (e.g., walking outside or driving her car) or
expose certain property (e.g., garbage on the outside) under circumstances that make
this activity/property susceptible to visual surveillance by the public.172 Locations
that are private would not fall under the public disclosure doctrine. For example, in
United States v. Karo,173 the Court found that beeper monitoring within the home
did not trigger the public disclosure doctrine because these movements could not be
“visually verified.”174
This requirement does not mean, however, that the government must actually
visually observe the action. All that matters is that the activity is capable of being
visually observed. For example, in Knotts and Jones, the defendant’s car was not
always under visual surveillance by the police but these movements were always
potentially observable.175 It is worth noting that analyzing Knotts or Jones using the
third party doctrine comes out differently. Since neither suspect was aware of the
beeper or GPS device and its emanating signal,176 neither could have voluntarily
disclosed his movements to the government. The public disclosure doctrine thus
does not implicate the same issues of how the government obtains the information.
The reason for this is because the public nature of the movements (e.g., the car’s
location) serves as the critical factor.
The third requirement, however, is the key trigger. In all the above-mentioned
cases applying the public disclosure doctrine, the government was monitoring the
movements or items while they were susceptible to visual observation.177 This kind
of contemporaneous government surveillance can happen by street observation,178
from above by plane,179 or via some type of monitoring device.180
Greenwood, or the garbage disposal case, may be a little trickier but it ultimately
follows the same pattern.181 The government (or its agent) still observes the property
171 See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
172 See Bedi, Cell Phone Location Data, supra note 4, at 514.
173 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
174 Id. at 715.
175 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 278–82 (1983).
176 Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278–82.
177 See discussion supra Section I.B.
178 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924).
179 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
180 Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278–82.
181 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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(i.e., takes it from the curbside) while it is susceptible to visual surveillance.182 It just
so happens that the disposal of garbage on the streets keeps the property in visual
observation for a lengthy period of time until the government takes it.
In this way, until element (3) happens, the individual’s actions or property are
not subject to the public disclosure doctrine and the defendant has the ability to
thwart its application.183 For example, an individual could take her disposed garbage
back inside the house or remove the marijuana from the front yard before a law
enforcement officer observes or otherwise monitors the property. At that point, the
items are no longer publicly available—i.e., susceptible to visual observation—and
the government will need to obtain a warrant before searching for them.184 Similarly,
if a person returns home after a public outing without the government monitoring
her movements, these movements would no longer be public and cannot be acquired
without first seeking a warrant.185 In the end, this limitation makes sense. Once the
very thing that places these items or movements outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment—i.e., their public status—is no longer present, the public disclosure
doctrine does not apply.186 To hold otherwise, would mean that anytime something
is publicly disclosed, even if for a brief moment, it is permanently without privacy
protection. Not only is this conclusion not supported by the relevant case law, but
also it would have unwanted implications for Fourth Amendment protection.187
III. BIG DATA AND APPLYING THE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES
A. Two Different Concepts—Two Different Analyses
Scholars arguing for the elimination or limitation of the disclosure doctrines in
light of today’s technological advancements have generally analyzed them as a package
182 In this case, the garbage collector was working with the government. Id.; see United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (noting that the Fourth Amendment applies to private in-
dividuals working on behalf of the government); supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
183 See supra discussion at Section I.B.
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185 How these movements would be memorialized in a way that can subject someone to
a warrant is a different issue.
186 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
discussion supra Section I.B.
187 Certain personal characteristics, however, such as the tone and manner of person’s
voice, their facial characteristics, or handwriting, are always considered publicly available and
the government thus can freely ask a person to create or present them without Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973). Because these things are con-
stantly exposed to the public, as the Court explained, “[n]o person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.” Id. This carve out seems reasonable
given the unique nature of these personal characteristics which are indelible to the way a
person presents herself to the world in a way that items or movements temporarily exposed
to the public are not.
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deal.188 But as two unique doctrines with unique triggers, they can be analyzed (and
thus constrained) separately.
One of the current controversies surrounding the third party doctrine is whether
the individual “voluntarily” transmitted the information to the third party. The dis-
closures in Smith v. Maryland and the informant cases seem noncontroversial.189
Things get trickier, however, when you include the myriad of disclosures (e.g., emails,
phone numbers, cell site location data, public street images) we make every day to
companies and ISPs.190 While individuals are certainly not coerced to make these
disclosures, can they really be considered voluntary given how ubiquitous and nec-
essary these actions have become? This was Justice Sotomayor’s point in Jones
regarding the need to reconsider the viability of the third party doctrine.191 Scholars,
too, have questioned whether today’s disclosure to these various entities and com-
panies are really voluntary.192
Resolution of this issue—while certainly an important question—does not bear
on the voluntariness element in the public disclosure case. It is not a disclosure to
a person or entity that vitiates privacy (in fact, the defendants in the cases cited
generally have no idea that the government is tracking them) but rather voluntarily
making oneself or an item susceptible to visual observation.193 This kind of assess-
ment is more straightforward and less controversial because individuals more easily
know when their activities are visually observable. However, this doctrine invokes
its own distinct privacy concerns and issues. Should public locations always be
susceptible to government monitoring? Can surveillance be too long such that it
impedes on individual privacy? Enter the mosaic theory as a means to limit the ap-
plication of the public disclosure doctrine when it comes to long-term surveillance.194
188 See supra notes 143–51 and accompanying text.
189 See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
190 I will discuss the specific issue of cell phone site location data in greater detail in
Section III.B.
191 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
supra notes 116–23 and accompanying text.
192 See Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 146, at 171–76 (discussing problems with the
Court’s analysis of the knowing or voluntary disclosure requirement in light of new tech-
nologies and the myriad of disclosures individuals make, including emails, phone number,
and cell site location data). Integral to this analysis would naturally include a discussion of
nature of the data (e.g., content vs. non-content disclosed). See also GRAY, AGE OF SURVEIL-
LANCE, supra note 2; Chris Conley, Non-Content Is Not Non-Sensitive: Moving Beyond the
Content/Non-Content Distinction, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821 (2014) (arguing that the
content/non-content distinction should be abandoned in the third party doctrine context).
193 See discussion supra Section I.B.1. Unlike in the third party context, the nature of the
information exposed to the public (either content vs. non-content) is not relevant. The public
disclosure doctrine applies to any information that is voluntarily disclosed to the public at
large. See discussion supra Section I.B.
194 See Bedi, Mosaic Theory, supra note 59, at 1810–11; supra notes 122–26 and accom-
panying text.
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Scholars, however, have pointed out the difficulty in applying this theory in the
context of public surveillance.195 How long is too long?196 Does it matter if there is
delay in surveillance?197 And what surveillance methods count toward the mosaic?198
Answering these questions (while important) do not bear on the elements of third
party doctrine and its proper scope.
I am not suggesting that the mosaic theory cannot also be applied to curtail the
impact of third party doctrine (even though it originated to combat the public dis-
closure doctrine). It can. Some scholars have argued that the government should
similarly be limited in its collection of big data such as phone records or other digitally
stored information.199 My point is simply that the Court can restrict one doctrine (via
the mosaic theory or some other limiting principle) without interfering with the full
application of the other or vice versa.
Perhaps most important, these two doctrines do not stand or fall together. The
Court could get rid of one doctrine without disturbing the effect of the other. For
example, as some have argued (including Justice Sotomayor), the third party
doctrine should not have a place in today’s technological world where disclosures
to various entities and individuals have become ubiquitous.200 This conclusion may
have its own repercussions for law enforcement investigative techniques but it does
not impact the application of the public disclosure doctrine.201 While police would
have to get a warrant before acquiring any information from a third party, they
would continue to be free to publicly surveil individuals without any restrictions.
One could also advocate for the converse. The Court could get rid of the public
disclosure doctrine (thus requiring police to get a warrant before surveilling anyone)
but keep intact the full effect of the third party doctrine.
There may also be instances (albeit infrequent) where both doctrines could
potentially apply. This would encompass situations where public information is dis-
closed to a third party. I have already referenced the case of an individual disposing
195 See, e.g., Bedi, Mosaic Theory, supra note 59, at 1845–48; Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 333–36 (2012).
196 See Kerr, supra note 195, at 333.
197 Id. at 334.
198 Id. at 334–35.
199 See, e.g., David Gray et al., Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 765–68, 785–88 (2013) [hereinafter Gray et al., Fighting Cybercrime]
(discussing how the mosaic theory could protect the collection of aggregated digital data).
200 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Henderson,
supra note 143, at 39–40 (celebrating that the Third Party Doctrine “has at least taken ill, and
it can be hoped it is an illness from which it will never recover”); see also supra notes
166–68 and accompanying text.
201 See Bedi, Mosaic Theory, supra note 59, at 1843 (discussing how getting rid of third
party doctrine may frustrate long standing investigative techniques including, for example,
use of undercover informants or gathering documents from a third party without a warrant
or probable cause).
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of garbage on the street as potentially triggering both doctrines.202 The use of Google
Street View by police presents a more recent example, albeit a controversial applica-
tion.203 In addition to the third party doctrine, one could argue for a possible applica-
tion of the public disclosure doctrine as a separate means of vitiating privacy. At the
time Google took the picture, the first two elements of the public disclosure doctrine
seemed to apply, namely an individual voluntarily made her movements susceptible
to visual observation.204
The sticking point, however, would be element (3) since a private company—
not the government—is conducting the surveillance at the moment the location is
publicly available. Unlike the disposed garbage scenario, the government only enters
the equation—by formally requesting that Google hand over the images—after the
location is no longer public.205 Is contemporaneous government (rather than private)
surveillance necessary for triggering this doctrine? In the Google hypothetical, an
answer is not consequential since the third party doctrine already vitiates privacy
protection.206 But what if it were a different company that was taking the street pic-
tures and it was not readily known to the public? Perhaps, Amazon has a secret drone
program that unbeknownst to the public, surveils the streets of most major cities.207
If the government requests this data from Amazon a person’s movements are no
longer public; does the Fourth Amendment apply? Here, unlike in the Google Street
hypothetical, there most likely would be no application of the third party doctrine
because the individual is not reasonably aware (either actually or constructively) that
her movements are being monitored by Amazon.208
202 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988); see supra notes 94–98 and accom-
panying text.
203 See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text.
205 It is worth pointing out that if Google on its own delivered the images to the police—
without any influence or the behest of government—the Fourth Amendment would not be
implicated because there would be no state action. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,
475 (1921) (“The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and . . . protection applies to government action.”).
206 Either doctrine thus is sufficient to vitiate privacy protection. Take the Knotts case.
There, third party doctrine does not even apply because the suspect—lacking knowledge of
the beeper—could not possibly have voluntarily conveyed his location to the government.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983). This fact was not relevant to the lack
of privacy protection because the suspect’s public movements and the direct government
surveillance of them fell directly under the public disclosure doctrine. Id. at 281–82. In the
Google hypothetical, it is the reverse. While it is not clear whether the elements of the public
disclosure are fully satisfied, the triggers for the third party doctrine are present. See supra
notes 159–65 and accompanying text.
207 See generally Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime
-Air/b?node=8037720011 [https://perma.cc/FWJ7-3MM7] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (de-
scribing Amazon’s new air delivery system utilizing drone delivery technology).
208 I qualify this statement because one could argue that today all individuals are
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It is not readily apparent that the public disclosure doctrine applies in this unique
context.209 All the relevant public disclosure cases described above—human obser-
vation,210 beeper tracking,211 GPS long term monitoring,212 aerial reconnaissance213—
involve direct government surveillance of locations that are publicly available at that
time. A definitive answer here ultimately depends on how one conceptualizes privacy
in this context. Because the image was susceptible to visual surveillance, one could
argue that as long as it was in fact observed or monitored at that time (regardless of
whether by the government or a private entity), an individual loses all expectation
of privacy. The government then is free to acquire it without a warrant.214 On the
other hand, one may argue that one only assumes the risk that the government—not
a private entity without any law enforcement interest—is surveilling the activity at that
time it is public. One does not assume the risk that the government will at a later date
request a private party to hand over the data after it is no longer in public view. It would
certainly be a significant change from the Court’s jurisprudence to include surveil-
lance by private actors as triggering the public disclosure doctrine.
Privacy advocates would no doubt push against this expansion and probably for
good reason. This would allow the government to more easily acquire erstwhile
public information from a third party on account of the fact that the government
could bypass the third party doctrine’s specific (and seemingly more rigorous) volun-
tariness requirement and rely instead on the more straightforward voluntariness
requirement of the public disclosure doctrine. These scenarios of private surveil-
lance of public movements are, thus, perhaps better left as potential applications of
the third party doctrine, a doctrine that explicitly incorporates the role of third
parties in the government’s collection efforts.
B. The Curious Case of Cell Site Location Data
1. A Primer on Cell Site Location Data
The disclosure doctrines have become increasingly relevant in the government
collection and monitoring of cell site location data. Cell phones use radio waves to
connect to their service provider in order to facilitate a host of functions, including,
constructively on notice that someone or some company is always watching their public
movements. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
209 The analysis would be easier if the government were working with Amazon to surveil
individuals in real time through this technology because this activity would trigger the third
element of contemporaneous government (sponsored) surveillance.
210 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924).
211 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276–82.
212 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).
213 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
214 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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making/receiving phone calls, sending/receiving text messages, and using the inter-
net.215 Cell phone providers, in turn, maintain thousands of cell phone towers that
receive these radio signals.216 Cell phones emit these signals anytime they are turned
on after which the nearest cell phone tower acquires the signal.217 The signal moves
from tower to tower as cell phone users change their location.218 The location of the
nearest cell tower is automatically transmitted to the cell phone provider anytime a
user makes or receives a call or text message.219 Cell phone providers collect and store
this cell site location data as the normal part of their business of providing service.220
Law enforcement use this data in two primary ways. The first involves acquiring
historical cell site data from the cell phone provider.221 Police request that the cell
phone provider provide authorities a set of location data for a suspect relating to a
specific period of time in the past.222 Police can then use this data to show that the
suspect was in the general area where the crime was committed.223 The second way
involves surveilling a suspect with real-time cell site data.224 Here, police request
that cell phone providers transmit the current location of the cell tower for direct
tracking purposes.225
215 See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 636–37 (N.J. 2013) (discussing the basics of how
cell site location data works).
216 Id. at 637.
217 Id.
218 Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question
of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702 (2011).
219 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Carpenter,
819 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-
402); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611–13 (5th Cir.
2013); Earls, 70 A.3d at 637–38.
220 Earls, 70 A.3d at 637.
221 See Patrick E. Corbett, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Site Location Information:
What Should We Do While We Wait for the Supremes?, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 215, 217 (2015).
222 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614.
223 Id.
224 See Corbett, supra note 221, at 217.
225 See generally In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). I recognize that as soon as the provider gives police the tower location, the
data is, technically speaking, a historical location as it happened in the past (albeit a few
seconds ago). The key distinction between historical versus real-time data is not the nature
of the actual cell tower location but the fact that in the real-time context, the government is
using this (historical) data to directly surveil the individual while her movements are public,
much like in the Jones and Knotts cases described above (where the location via the GPS/
beeper signal would also technically be historical in nature). See supra Section I.B.2. Police
may also “ping” a cell phone as a variation of this real-time surveillance. Only this time, the
government does not wait for the phone itself to send its routine signal to the cell tower.
Rather, the police request that cell phone providers send an affirmative signal to the suspect’s
phone in order to directly monitor her cell site location. See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation
Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 132–33.
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2. How Courts Have Applied the Doctrines
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the status of police use of cell site
location data, the consensus amongst circuit courts appears to be that this govern-
ment activity falls outside of the scope of the Fourth Amendment.226 Most appellate
courts that have addressed this issue have focused on historical cell site location
data.227 These decisions generally have relied on the third party doctrine and the
precedent in Smith v. Maryland to find that the individual voluntarily discloses her
location to the cell provider. The Fifth Circuit, for example, reasoned that a “cell
service [user], like a telephone user, understands that his cell phone must send a
signal to a nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly connect his call.”228 The court cited
to evidence that a “cell service providers’ and subscribers’ contractual terms of
service . . . expressly state that a provider uses a subscriber’s location information
to route his cell phone calls.”229 The Fourth Circuit similarly focused on the common
knowledge of cell phone users in this context: “As most cell phone users know all
too well, proximity to a cell tower is necessary to complete these tasks. Anyone who
has stepped outside to ‘get a signal,’ or has warned a caller of a potential loss of
service . . . understands, on some level, that location matters.”230 The Sixth Circuit
similarly concluded “any cellphone user who has seen her phone’s signal strength
fluctuate must know that, when she places or receives a call, her phone ‘exposes’ its
location to the nearest cell tower and thus to the company that operates the tower.”231
Not all courts agree with this analysis. For example, the Third Circuit in finding
that the third party doctrine does not apply, emphasized the lack of voluntariness.232
It reasoned that a cell phone user does not “share[ ] his location information with a
226 It appears that the Court has recently granted cert in United States v. Carpenter, 819
F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402); see also
Amy Howe, Justices to Tackle Cell Phone Data Case Next Term, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5,
2017, 12:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/justices-tackle-cellphone-data-case
-next-term/ [https://perma.cc/SF3R-7D7N].
227 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016); Carpenter, 819 F.3d
880; United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Application of U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600; In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Comm’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
Scholars too have analyzed how (if at all) the Fourth Amendment should apply to cell site
location data. See, e.g., Levinson-Waldman, supra note 124, at 536–39, 553–55; Tokson,
Knowledge, supra note 146, at 159–63.
228 In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613.
229 Id.
230 Graham, 824 F.3d at 430.
231 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888. The court also focused on the fact that location data was
non-content in nature much like the data in Smith v. Maryland. Id.
232 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Comm’n Serv.
to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 317.
2017] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES 489
cellular phone provider in any meaningful way . . . [as] it is unlikely that cell phone
customers are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical loca-
tion information.”233 The court concluded that the customer only knowingly and
voluntarily conveys the number to the cell phone provider.234
As discussed earlier, the issue of voluntariness pervades a discussion of the third
party doctrine and new technologies.235 Reasonable people can disagree on whether
courts should find this disclosure to be a voluntary one.236 My purpose here is not
to settle this question in this context. I am more interested in the way courts have
muddied the waters by interjecting a discussion of the public doctrine when talking
about historical cell site location data.
The Fourth Circuit, for example, includes discussions of the public nature of the
data in arguing against Fourth Amendment protection under the third party doc-
trine.237 After applying Smith v. Maryland, the court seems to support its conclusion
by noting that this location information is public in nature, quite different from the
private information in Karo or Kyllo.238 But the public nature of this data (or lack of
it) is not relevant to an application of the third party doctrine.239 To further confuse
matters, in the next paragraph, the court seems to recognize that historical cell site data
does not implicate “direct government surveillance” and the key issue is whether the
government “invades an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy when it ob-
tains, from a third party, the third party’s records, which permit the government to
deduce location information.”240
The Sixth Circuit, too, seems to indirectly discuss the public disclosure doctrine.241
It raises the potential application of Jones and long-term monitoring but ultimately
distinguishes the case because cell site location data is less precise than GPS data.242
But, the more pertinent distinction rests on the fact that the monitoring in Jones
involved contemporaneous government surveillance in a way that the collection of
historical location data does not.243
233 Id.
234 Id. at 317–18.
235 See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
236 See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Texting the Government Your Location: The Case of Historical
Cell Phone Location Data and Fourth Amendment Protection, CASETEXT (Aug. 26, 2015),
https://www.casetext.com/posts/texting-the-government-your-location [https://perma.cc
/CG33-2JND].
237 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2016).
238 Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984)).
239 See generally discussion supra Section I.A.
240 Graham, 824 F.3d at 426 (emphasis removed).
241 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
242 The Sixth Circuit correctly noted that there was no trespass with the collection of cell
site location as in the Jones case. Id.
243 See id. at 895.
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The Third Circuit’s discussion of the public disclosure doctrine was more direct
and consequential.244 While it concluded that disclosing cell location data to the cell
phone company was not voluntary—and thus the third party doctrine did not apply—
it nonetheless found that the public disclosure doctrine did apply.245 Citing Knotts,
the Court explained:
We cannot reject the hypothesis that [historical cell site location
data] may, under certain circumstances, be used to approximate
the past location of a person. If it can be used to allow the infer-
ence of present, or even future, location, in this respect [cell site
location data] may resemble a tracking device which provides
information as to the actual whereabouts of the subject. The
Knotts/Karo opinions make clear that the privacy interests at issue
are confined to the interior of the home. There is no evidence in
this record that historical [cell site location data] . . . extends to
th[is] realm. We therefore cannot accept the . . . conclusion that
[this data] . . . requires probable cause for its production.246
The point here seems to be that historical cell site location data is similar in nature
to tracking technologies that catalog a suspect’s public location, which the court
uses to explain why the public disclosure doctrine applies equally to both. But the
critical distinction, again, between these two situations—and, in turn, a proper ap-
plication of the public disclosure—rests on the fact that Knotts and Karo involved
contemporaneous government surveillance, a feature not present in the historical
location data context.247 I address this issue in more detail below.
Real-time location data would appear to fall or stand with historical location
data, at least when it comes to an application of the third party doctrine. This infor-
mation, too, is “in fact, a stored, historical record because it [was] received by the
cell phone service provider and stored, if only momentarily, before being forwarded
to law enforcement officials.”248 For this reason, some courts have treated historical
and real-time data the same way, finding no protection based on an application of
the third party doctrine.249
244 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
245 Id. at 313.
246 Id. at 312–13 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
247 Id.
248 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on
a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
249 See id.; see also United States v. Wallace, 866 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2017); In re Smart-
phone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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3. Picking and Choosing Between the Doctrines
Courts seem to pick and choose whether they focus on the third party doctrine,
public disclosure doctrine, or both when analyzing cell site location data. Part of the
problem centers on the unique nature of this data. On the one hand, the government
can treat it like the collection of non-public information, no different than dialed
telephone numbers (think historical location data).250 On the other hand, this data can
also be seen as publicly available data that facilitates surveillance, no different than
GPS monitoring (think real-time location data).251
Historically, the collection of non-public information and surveillance of public
movements were neatly separated. Collection of bank records, telephone numbers,
incriminating statements, are all information gathering activities of non-public data
that have nothing to do with surveillance of the suspect’s physical location.252 On
the other hand, use of beeper monitoring, aerial reconnaissance, GPS are all surveil-
lance methods of a suspect’s public movements that do nothing more than relay her
physical location.253
Police use of cell site location data has blurred these lines, thus contributing to
the inconsistent application of the disclosure doctrines.254 Full resolution of Fourth
Amendment protection in this context is beyond the scope of this Article. That said,
it is important to understand the doctrinal reach of each disclosure doctrine in this
unique area so that courts and scholars are in a better position to analyze privacy
protection here.
Take the scenario of the government collecting historical cell site location data.
The government acquiring this data stands on the same footing as the government
acquiring a history of telephone numbers from the telephone company over a period
of time. Both scenarios suggest a potential application of the third party doctrine.
The critical question would be whether an individual voluntarily discloses her lo-
cation information in the same way she discloses dialed phone numbers. For the
reasons mentioned earlier, courts understandably can disagree on this issue. Assum-
ing a voluntary disclosure, however, the other elements are satisfied.255 Like the
250 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see also discussion supra Section
III.B.
251 See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
252 See discussion supra Section I.A.
253 See discussion supra Section I.B. I recognize that location data (whether by GPS,
beeper, or cell phone use) is also a type of information and so even in the second scenario,
the government is technically “collecting information.” But the key difference here is that
this information (unlike telephone data) is susceptible to visual observation and facilitates
surveillance of the suspect.
254 See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
255 Courts could still try to limit the full effect of the doctrine using the mosaic theory. See
supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
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phone numbers in Smith v. Maryland,256 the government acquires the location data
directly from the cell phone provider.257 It isn’t clear though why the Fourth Circuit
focused on the public nature of the location data in its third party doctrine cal-
culus.258 It is the voluntariness of the disclosure that does the work, not whether the
information is public or private.259 In fact, most of the aforementioned third party
doctrine cases have involved private information (e.g., cell phone numbers, conver-
sations, and bank records).260
An application of the public disclosure doctrine in the historical cell site data
context would be controversial.261 The difficulty would be similar to the issue in my
Amazon hypothetical. There is no government surveillance, only surveillance by a
private entity. The government—much like in the Amazon case—only enters the
picture after the fact when the location is no longer public. As previously explained,
this application goes against prior precedent and potentially raises privacy concerns
on the expansion of the government’s ability to acquire information by bypassing
the third party doctrine’s voluntariness requirement. Before courts simply conclude
that the public disclosure doctrine (and its related cases) should reach historical
location data (as the Third Circuit, for instance, has done), they must first address
these important doctrinal and related policy concerns.262
Real-time location data stands or falls together with historical data as far as an
application of the third party doctrine.263 With real time data, the government is
similarly acquiring the information from the cell phone provider, only this time the
focus is on recent locations as opposed to past ones.264 Whether this doctrine applies
here again depends on if the disclosure to the provider is considered to be a volun-
tary one.265
Real time location data, however, seems more likely to lose Fourth Amendment
protection because of the public disclosure doctrine. Here, unlike the historical data
scenario, all the three elements are satisfied. The police are monitoring the suspect’s
public location (via a cell tower location) at the same time the suspect’s location is
susceptible to visual observation.266 The cell site location data in this context thus
256 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
257 See discussion supra Section II.A.
258 See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2016).
259 The fact that the data, however, can be seen as non-content or metadata like phone
numbers would be relevant to a third party doctrine calculus.
260 See discussion supra Section I.A.
261 The first two elements would be satisfied because the suspect voluntarily makes her
location susceptible to public observation at the time the cell phone provider records it.
262 See, e.g., discussion supra Section III.B.2.
263 Corbett, supra note 221, at 217.
264 Id.
265 See discussion supra Section II.A.
266 I understand that the transmitted location is of the cell tower not the individual’s spe-
cific public location. But this distinction is inconsequential since they both would be public
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plays the same role as a GPS or beeper. All of these technologies are being used by
the government to contemporaneously monitor the suspect’s public movements. The
only difference is that the government is acquiring the location from the provider
rather than directly from the GPS or beeper.267
The difference in Fourth Amendment protection between real time data (most
likely not protected under public disclosure doctrine) and historical data (may not be
protected under the third party or public disclosure doctrines) makes sense when
assessing the relative privacy concerns in each scenario. With stored data, the police
can have easy access to significant amounts of location history without expending
resources to gather it.268 There is no practical limitation to the time frame they may
acquire. This concern may militate in favor of having a more robust requirement of
voluntariness under the third party doctrine so it is harder to acquire this information
without Fourth Amendment protection. On the other hand, use of real-time data has
some built in practical limitations making the need for Fourth Amendment protection
perhaps less important. There is some cost to conducting this kind of surveillance.
Police will have to expend resources to monitor a suspect’s movements via cell towers,
particularly long term surveillance. While cell phone technology—not unlike the
GPS tracking in Jones—will certainly alleviate some of this work compared to tra-
ditional visual surveillance, officers will still need to do more work above and beyond
simply requesting a set of historical locations from a provider.269 Because of this
built in cost, an application of the public disclosure doctrine (with its more easily
satisfied voluntariness requirement) to real time cell site location data may not be
as detrimental to privacy concerns.
CONCLUSION
This Article probably ends with more questions than it answers when it comes
to the disclosure doctrines. How should we define voluntariness when applying the
locations and the former is simply a proximate location of the latter. It is also possible for the
government to acquire historical location data for a period of time and, with that information,
work with the cell phone provider to thereafter surveil the individual’s public movements via
cell towers. Constitutionally speaking, each activity—the initial collection of historical data
and the subsequent contemporaneous monitoring—would be analyzed separately.
267 For similar reasons, a situation where the government is monitoring cell tower location
data by “pinging” an individual’s cell phone would also likely not garner privacy protection.
See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated
on other grounds, sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005) (finding that even
though third party doctrine did not apply because government, in collaboration with cell phone
company, triggered the location transmission, the public disclosure doctrine vitiates Fourth
Amendment because this real-time data was a proxy for the suspect’s public locations).
268 See Corbett, supra note 221, at 215–17.
269 Cf. 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the relative expenditure
of police resources for surveillance via GPS compared with traditional observation).
494 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:461
third party doctrine to new technologies? Does the kind of technology being used
make a difference? Should the public disclosure doctrine be expanded to include
private surveillance of an individual’s public movements? Should the mosaic theory
apply to one, both, or none of the disclosure doctrines? These are not easy questions,
and I do not pretend to have all the answers. But before we can even begin to tackle
these difficult issues, it is imperative we understand the historical context and unique
contours of each doctrine. They are not the same thing, nor has the Court applied them
in the same way. For prudential reasons, we must strive for a logical and cautious
application of these principles that is firmly grounded in prior precedent. Otherwise
courts as well as scholars risk muddying the waters and, in turn, making unnecessar-
ily overly broad or erroneous conclusions on important privacy matters. This Article
finally provides a workable topology towards this end from which we can intelli-
gently discuss whether and how these disclosure doctrines should, or should not, apply
to future technologies.
